5. Central & State Government’s Arguments

• The Central Government has consistently maintained that because Delhi is the national capital and the face of the country, it must have control over administrative services, which include appointments and transfers.
• On the other hand, the Delhi government has argued that in the interest of federalism, the elected representatives must have power over transfers and postings.
• The Delhi government had also contended that the recent amendments to the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (Amendment) Act, 2021, violate the doctrine of the basic structure of the Constitution.

6. Does the Ordinance go against the Supreme Court judgment? 

• The Ordinance is based on the argument that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the superior authority of Parliament makes laws for the national capital.
• A review petition filed by the Centre in the Supreme Court claimed that Delhi is not a “full-fledged State” but only a Union Territory which is an extension of the Union.
• The Parliament is Delhi’s true legislature, the Centre has argued. However, the May 11 judgment addresses this contention by acknowledging that though Delhi is not a full­fledged State, its Legislative Assembly is constitutionally entrusted with the power to legislate upon the subjects in the State List and Concurrent List.
• The unanimous judgment held that though Delhi is not a State under the First Schedule to the Constitution, it is conferred with the power to legislate upon subjects “to give effect to the aspirations of the people of NCTD”.
• It has a democratically elected government that is accountable to the people of the NCTD.
  Under the constitutional scheme envisaged in Article 239AA(3), NCTD was given legislative power which though limited, in many aspects is similar to States.
• In that sense, with the addition of Article 239AA, the Constitution created an “asymmetric federal model” with the Union of India at the center, and the NCTD at the regional level. 
• The May 11 judgment also referred to how the majority in a 2018 Constitution Bench judgment had held that while NCTD could not be accorded the status of a State, the concept of federalism would still apply to NCTD.
• The court had held that the executive power of the Delhi government was “coextensive” with its legislative power.
• That is, the executive arm of the government covers all the subjects, including services, except public order, police, and land, for which the legislative arm can make laws.

7. What do the Ordinance and the judgment say about the LG’s powers?

• The Ordinance has put the LG back in the driver’s seat by giving him the power to take a final call on any decision taken by the NCCSA regarding services.
• This is even though the LG’s powers were curtailed way back in 2018 by another Constitution Bench judgment. 
• On May 11, the court agreed with its conclusions in 2018 that the LG was bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 239AA(4) while exercising executive powers in relation to matters falling within the legislative domain of the legislative assembly of NCTD.
• The court had held that even the “limited discretionary power” afforded to the LG “ought to be exercised in a careful manner in rare circumstances such as on matters of national interest and finance.

DO SONS CONTRIBUTE MORE TOWARD ELDERLY CARE

1. Context 

2. Key points

• Old age support is one of the main factors driving the preference for a son.
• Our society is known to prefer sons, to the extent of resorting to illegal sex-selective abortion.
• The gender and intergenerational dynamics in conjunction with expectations of children, the authors analyse "the relative contributions of sons and daughters to the wellbeing of their parents, especially in the absence of sons".

• In the process, the authors draw attention to the contributions that married daughters make to their natal families an aspect that tends to become invisible in a patrilocal culture (a residence pattern where a woman shifts to her husband's home or community after marriage).
• Significantly, the analysis is embedded in a political economy framework, which holds that people have children not only out of love or for emotional reasons but also because "they invest in children as a way of guaranteeing their future, both in terms of the continuity of lineage and their care once they become old".
• The review of existing literature shows this to be the case in different countries and cultures, especially in the context of poor economic development and or in the absence of universal pensions or social welfare.

3. Reasons for the preference

• In the West, the welfare of the elderly is guaranteed through relatively well-funded pension and social security systems.
• But in India, which has the world's second-largest population of people over the age of 60 and where over 90 per cent of the workforce is in the unorganised sector, pensions are limited to a tiny minority employed in the public sector and to a lesser extent, in the private sector.
• "Economic and social policies to ensure the welfare of the elderly in India are limited" in a context where "poverty incidence is higher among the elderly, especially older women," leading to greater economic dependency.
• They thus end up relying on family and their labour to take care of themselves. This is where a son becomes "preferable" over a daughter.
• "While a son contributes economically even after marriage, it is by bringing a daughter-in-law that he ensures the care of his parents especially when they grow old".
• As a result, "Son preference reinforces the lower status of women through sex selection as well as discrimination against surviving daughters".
• Also, parents with sons, through the practice of arranged marriage, tend to select "submissive daughter-in-law to ensure old age support", which again affects gender equality.
• The flip side of this practice is that "since a (married) daughter is not expected to care for her natal family, not only is she valued less but it is likely that her contributions are invisibilised".
• Existing research also suggests that "sons may not always care for their parents out of a sense of duty but may do so to derive benefits from providing support, for example, a higher inheritance or elderly parents taking care of grandchildren".
• A key study referenced in the paper is the Korean success story in reversing the sex ratio imbalance, which suggests that an effective strategy to curb "daughter elimination" rampant in states like Haryana is "publicly financed policies to ensure financial support and health care for the elderly" which can reduce their dependence on sons.

4. The Study

• Coming to India, as per a 2013 countrywide survey, 85 per cent of elderly co-reside with their children.
• More elderly women than men live alone. The same study also found that "Expectations about old age are extremely oriented to sons with 80 per cent of young parents expecting to be supported by sons when they get old.
• According to a 2012 UNFPA study covering seven States, "nearly 50 per cent of the elderly live in joint families with their spouses, children and grandchildren" and there was a "strong preference to live with sons, while preference for living with daughters of being supported by them was low".
• Also, for the most part, studies on elderly care in India do not examine whether and how married daughters support their parents or what is the care arrangement in daughter-only families.

1. Elderly care is central to the issue of daughter discrimination
2. As everyone assumes parents will live with their sons and that daughters are not expected to contribute, this has acquired the status of what is "normal". As a result, even when daughters contribute, survey respondents indicate that it is sons who support them.
3. Given that the married daughter's income is likely to be pooled with the husband's, the daughter's support to her parents may be limited to emotional and social.
4. When married daughters do support their parents financially which they may do with or without the knowledge of their husbands their parents may not reveal such support because of fear of social censure, which in turn perpetuates the discourse that married daughters do not support their parents financially.

• The second part of this paper seeks to address this gap in the existing literature by studying care patterns among elderly parents residing in Haryana, a state with one of the lowest 06 sex ratios in India it was 834 as per the 2011 census, as against India's 919 and the expected ratio of 952 girls per 1, 000 boys.
• Out of the State's 21 districts, the authors focussed on four that had the highest proportion of the elderly (60 and above years). 
• A total of 684 elderly households located in 56 villages were surveyed.

5. Contribution of Daughters

• The survey compared expectations (of support) versus experiences. While half the households expected that sons would take care of them in their old age, only 15 per cent expected financial support from their daughters.
• 62 per cent of the respondents said that having a son was advantageous in their old age, while the corresponding figure for daughters was only 31 per cent.
• However, elderly respondents overwhelmingly appreciated the non-financial care provided by daughters regardless of their marital status.
• An interesting element that emerged was that "even though there is greater expectation and experience of receiving financial support from sons, a substantial proportion expect to rely on their savings/ assets in old age".
• For a clearer picture of the patterns of financial support, the authors gathered information on household income and sources of income.
• The annual household incomes of the households surveyed, on average, amounted to ₹ 1.3 lakhs a year, which was much lower than Haryana's per capita income in 2019 (₹2.5 lakhs).
• The study found that annual household incomes were significantly lower in daughter-only households, while there were no significant differences in average incomes between son-only and mixed-children households.
• In the bulk of the families, the main source of income was the Haryana government's Old Age Samman Allowance (in 2019 it provided ₹2, 000 per month to 60 + persons domiciled in Haryana).
• In the case of son-only families, children contribute 24 per cent of household income, while in the case of daughter-only families, the daughter's contribution amounts to only 1. 5 per cent of household income.
• Daughter-only families also have lower incomes and rely more on income from pensions and their jobs or farms.
• In mixed families, sons contribute 16 per cent of household income, while daughters were reported not to contribute.
• However, what's telling is the support, or the lack of it, from children during emergencies.
• In the case of almost all types of shocks, the elderly tend to rely on their resources, the paper found. They borrow or sell assets.
• The reliance on such a coping strategy ranges from 45 per cent of shock-affected households in the case of economic shocks to 77 per cent in the case of natural shocks the survey found.
• Interestingly, "reliance on both sons and daughters is low or negligible for all shock types".
• In the case of a health shock, however, there was more support from daughters (11 per cent) as compared to sons (8 per cent) which goes against the grain of beliefs and myths that underpin son preference.
• The study concludes by noting that given the higher prevalence of poverty and illness, especially among older women, and among the elderly with only daughters, there is an urgent need for further strengthening health coverage and pension support.