• The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, commonly known as the Wassenaar Agreement, is an international export control regime that was established in 1996 in Wassenaar, the Netherlands.
• It came into existence as a successor to the Cold War–era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which had been created to restrict the export of sensitive technologies to the Soviet bloc.
• Unlike COCOM, which was directed against specific countries, the Wassenaar Arrangement is not aimed at any single state; rather, it seeks to promote greater transparency and responsibility in transfers of arms and sensitive technologies globally.
• The key objective of the agreement is to ensure that exports of conventional arms and dual-use goods (technologies that can be used for both civilian and military purposes) do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that could undermine regional or international security and stability.
• It emphasizes responsible transfers and prevention of destabilizing accumulations of arms, while at the same time recognizing the right of states to engage in legitimate trade for self-defence and economic development.
• Under the Wassenaar Arrangement, member states—currently numbering 42, including major arms exporters like the United States, Russia, and many EU nations—maintain and share information about their transfers of arms and sensitive technologies. The arrangement has two control lists: one for conventional arms and another for dual-use goods and technologies.
• Member countries use these lists to guide their own national export control policies. However, unlike a treaty, the Wassenaar Arrangement is not legally binding; instead, it relies on political commitments and voluntary cooperation among participants.
• For India, joining the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2017 was a significant milestone. It gave India access to advanced technologies and boosted its image as a responsible player in global non-proliferation architecture.
• Membership also complements India’s participation in other export control regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group, strengthening its case for eventual entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
• One of the most significant global mechanisms in this field is the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral framework designed to regulate exports of conventional weapons as well as dual-use goods and technologies.
• It operates on a voluntary coordination model where member states agree to follow common control lists and share information, but each government ultimately retains autonomy in granting licenses, implementing rules, and enforcing them.
• In 2013, its scope was widened to cover “intrusion software”—programs intended to circumvent security systems in networks, and certain surveillance or cyber-surveillance tools.
• Yet, the framework was originally built at a time when export controls were primarily concerned with physical items such as chips, hardware components, and devices, while software exchanges were regarded as secondary.

• This legacy design creates ambiguity for modern digital environments, particularly with technologies linked to cloud services. For instance, the Arrangement does not consistently treat the use, access, or remote management of software as an “export,” and it leaves room for countries to interpret technology transfers differently.
• The rise of the software-as-a-service (SaaS) model complicates the situation further, as users rely on remote functionalities rather than installing programs locally, a scenario that the Arrangement does not clearly define as an export of controlled technology.
• Another limitation is its consensus-based nature, which means any single participant can block proposed changes. Even when controls are introduced, the Arrangement requires each member to enforce them through its own national export control laws, which vary significantly in scope, ambition, and political will.
• This leads to uneven application across states, and many countries maintain exceptions for purposes such as defensive security research or internal transfers of technology, leaving considerable loopholes in the system

• India became a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017 and integrated its control lists into its SCOMET framework (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment, and Technologies).
• However, like many other members, India’s participation has largely been about enhancing its credibility in international export-control systems, rather than pushing for reforms that would make the Arrangement responsive to challenges posed by cloud-based technologies.
• Consequently, despite its growing membership, the regime has struggled to keep pace with emerging technologies most prone to misuse in surveillance and repression.
• For the Arrangement to stay relevant, its mandate must expand considerably. The catalogue of controlled technologies should explicitly cover digital infrastructure and services capable of enabling mass surveillance, profiling, discrimination, or cross-border data-driven policing—such as regional biometric databases or transnational data-sharing mechanisms.
• This would mean defining thresholds of capacity, while at the same time creating safeguards and licensing provisions that distinguish legitimate defensive or benign applications.
• Another limitation lies in how export is still framed predominantly as a physical transfer or software download. In the cloud era, however, an “export” could just as easily involve remote activation or an API call.
• The Arrangement therefore requires binding rules that equate remote enablement, delegation of administration rights, or authorisation with export whenever they provide access to a controlled technology.
• Moreover, stronger end-use controls are essential: for digital surveillance tools, the main danger is not military proliferation but mass violations of human rights.
• Licensing should thus be conditional not only on the technical nature of the product but also on who the user is, the jurisdiction they operate in, the governing oversight mechanisms, and the potential risk of abuse.
• The Arrangement’s voluntary character is another weakness, especially in high-risk environments.
• To be effective, a binding treaty or framework is needed, one that lays down minimum licensing standards, mandates denial of exports to atrocity-prone regions, and establishes mechanisms for peer monitoring and review.
• Given the borderless nature of cloud services, where actions in one jurisdiction can create consequences in another, stronger coordination is also vital. National authorities should be required to share information, harmonise licensing policies, and maintain common resources such as technical standards, a watchlist of suspicious users or entities, and real-time alert systems—for instance, to flag when a cloud provider extends services to a blacklisted state.
• Finally, because cloud and AI technologies evolve rapidly, the Arrangement must match that pace. A dedicated technical secretariat or expert committee could be empowered to suggest interim measures, accelerate the adoption of urgent controls, and integrate advice from independent specialists.
• Introducing a sunset clause—whereby controlled items automatically lapse unless actively renewed—could also keep the regime current. In fact, considering the difficulty of building global consensus, it may be worthwhile to establish parallel, domain-specific regimes for areas like AI, digital surveillance, and cyber weapons. These could align with the broader Wassenaar framework while retaining the flexibility to adapt more swiftly

Some influential countries may oppose tighter regulations on cloud services, claiming that such measures could hinder innovation, infringe on national sovereignty, or place excessive burdens on private companies. Because the Wassenaar Arrangement works by consensus, even a few dissenting states—particularly those that profit from exporting surveillance technologies—can obstruct reforms. On top of that, aligning cloud-based systems with existing control categories, setting thresholds, distinguishing between legitimate and harmful uses, and managing cross-border licensing make the process highly complex.

Nevertheless, a practical route forward remains feasible—and perhaps necessary—within the framework of the Arrangement. Certain countries, particularly within the European Union, have already begun introducing national-level export controls for advanced technologies that currently fall outside the scope of Wassenaar. The EU’s updated dual-use regulation, for example, now recognises that the transfer of cloud services can, in some cases, be subject to the same rules governing dual-use items

NATIONAL SPACE LAW