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The mapping of the India-China border
For Preliminary Examination: Current events of national and international things like the India-China border
For Mains Examination: GS II - International relations
Context:
In a three-part series on the India-China border issue that appeared in the columns of The Hindu from September 5-9, 2025, the author, Manoj Joshi, develops a narrative on the assertion that the India-China border was not properly defined. This article presents another view on the same.
Read about:
India-China border
Simla Conference (1913-14)
Key takeaways:
Official Manchu Maps
- During the Manchu dynasty’s 267-year rule (1644–1911), two significant maps of the empire were prepared with the technical assistance of European Jesuits. Both were drawn to scale with coordinate lines.
- The first, commissioned by Emperor Kangxi in 1721, depicted Tibet’s southern boundary as ending at the Himalayan crest. In this view, Tibet was never considered a trans-Himalayan entity, since Tibetans historically did not live south of the range. Thus, the Tawang region, though Buddhist, lay south of the divide and was not classified as Tibetan territory.
- This position was later reinforced by the Chinese representative at the Simla Conference (1913–14), who explicitly stated that Tibet had no claims over the tribal belt on the Assam side of the Himalayas (today’s Arunachal Pradesh), since those communities were neither Tibetan by ethnicity nor under Tibetan authority.
- Moreover, the Republic of China’s (RoC) delegate refrained from asserting sovereignty over this tribal belt, leaving it to the Indian side to incorporate it within Assam, which had long exercised influence there. Consequently, the Indo-Tibetan boundary settlement of March 1914—known as the 1914 alignment—was consistent with the Kangxi map.
- The second imperial map, ordered by Emperor Qianlong in 1761, recorded the Manchu bequest in the eastern Turkestan–Kashmir sector.
- It indicated that eastern Turkestan was not viewed as extending across the Kunlun mountains. Therefore, the barren lands stretching south to the Hindu Kush and Karakoram were not claimed by the Manchus.
- In 1899, a proposal was made to divide this territory according to watershed principles, producing the Kashmir–Sinkiang boundary line, later recognized as the 1899 alignment (linked to the Aksai Chin area).
Emergence of Contradictory Claims
- After the fall of the Manchu dynasty, no further official maps were produced by that regime. However, during World War II in 1943, the weakened RoC began disregarding earlier Manchu cartographic records (the 1721 and 1761 maps) and asserted claims over large portions of Indian territory.
- When questioned, RoC authorities dismissed the new depiction as only a rough draft requiring revision. A similar map was issued again in December 1947, coinciding with India’s preoccupation with the conflict in Kashmir.
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) inherited this practice. In October 1954, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai openly admitted to Jawaharlal Nehru that many of the maps being circulated were outdated reproductions, and he denied any deliberate attempt to alter boundaries—criticizing the Kuomintang’s (RoC’s) approach as “ridiculous.”
- Yet, during his 1960 discussions with Nehru in New Delhi, Zhou presented a carefully crafted narrative in defense of the Chinese position. He sought to undermine India’s evidence through rhetorical strategies rather than verifiable facts, while avoiding reliance on Chinese-origin documents that might weaken his case.
- Zhou gradually revealed his preferred approach: to set aside historical maps and documents, and instead negotiate on the basis of general principles he formulated. Analysts, including former Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale in The Long Game, interpret this as a strategic trap, since no record suggests Zhou ever proposed a genuine territorial swap (cedin