Context:

India’s federal structure, a core pillar of its constitutional democracy, is facing unprecedented strain. The Supreme Court’s opinion on the 16th Presidential Reference concerning gubernatorial powers has revived the debate on the balance between Union authority and State autonomy.

UPSC EXAM NOTES ANALYSIS

1. The Union and States are Equal Partners

• Under India’s constitutional framework, the Union and the States are meant to function as co-equal entities, with the Centre regarded merely as the first among equals.
• States are not designed to function as subordinates or extensions of the Union government, nor are they expected to comply unquestioningly with directions from New Delhi.
• In fact, in matters listed under the State List—such as land administration and public order—they possess full constitutional authority. Any interpretation that dilutes this balance runs counter to the federal vision adopted by the Constitution’s framers.
• When a Governor keeps Bills passed by an elected State Legislature pending for long periods, sends them back for reconsideration, and then reserves them for Presidential assent even after reaffirmation by the Legislature, it effectively places the democratic mandate of an elected body at the mercy of an unelected constitutional figure. Such a situation is fundamentally undemocratic.
• Governors, being appointed by the Central government, often act in alignment with the political priorities of the ruling party at the Centre. This political reality cannot be brushed aside.
• Thus, the tension between federalism and democratic values arises when the so-called “unwritten and undefined powers” of the Governor—interpreted by the Supreme Court—are weighed against the clear mandate of an elected State government that represents the people’s will. Allowing a Governor to override this mandate raises serious constitutional concerns.
• Once a State Legislature completes the law-making process, it is essential to interpret Article 200 as requiring the Governor to act within a reasonable, defined time frame, in line with the federal character of the Constitution, which forms part of its basic structure.
• This is not only logical but necessary in an era marked by increasing administrative overreach. The two-judge Bench in the Tamil Nadu Governor’s case recognised this need and suggested clear and finite timelines accordingly

2. Governor and President Powers

• The authority exercised by a Governor must be evaluated against the standard of reasonableness—that is, the time taken to examine and decide on a Bill should fall within a rational limit.
• Without such an implied timeframe, the Governor risks functioning as an unelected autocrat over a democratically chosen government.
• It is vital to recall that the Constitution is underpinned by principles of fairness, rationality and non-arbitrariness, particularly reflected in Part III, which shields citizens from arbitrary state action.
• Granting unchecked, monarch-like powers to Governors or even the President over elected bodies would erode the very foundation of constitutional governance.
• Judicial review is itself an essential component of the Constitution’s basic structure. No institution—however elevated, including Parliament—can claim that its decisions are beyond judicial scrutiny.
• Therefore, the actions of the Governor or the President cannot remain outside the ambit of judicial review.
• Their constitutional offices do not stand above Parliament, and since Parliament’s actions are reviewable, it follows that Governors and the President, also creatures of the Constitution, cannot claim exemption.
• The Court’s notion of 'limited direction' runs contrary to key constitutional principles—federalism, Article 14’s mandate of reasonableness, the doctrine of judicial review, and the values of fairness and justice.
• Allowing Governors or the President unrestricted discretion to indefinitely delay crucial legislation effectively enables a pocket veto. Such a situation traps States under the unpredictable authority of these offices and forces them repeatedly to seek judicial intervention merely to secure assent for validly enacted laws. In the long run, this arrangement cannot be justified either constitutionally or democratically

3. Challenges with Federal Structure

• A key shortcoming of the opinion is its failure to situate the issue within the wider pattern of systemic central encroachment on federal principles in recent years. Several developments illustrate this trend.
• To begin with, the Union government’s reluctance to compensate producing States for revenue losses under the Goods and Services Tax regime has had the effect of discouraging efficient governance and robust revenue mobilisation.
• Next, the Centre’s increasing reliance on cesses—whose proceeds are not shareable with States—has been used to justify withholding a portion of revenue that should otherwise flow to them.
• A third concern is the Centre’s unwillingness to fully honour the devolution formula recommended by the Finance Commission, depriving States of funds they are constitutionally entitled to receive.
• Additionally, States are being compelled to accept uniform conditions attached to centrally sponsored schemes, many of which require them to contribute up to half of the total expenditure. For States already facing fiscal strain, such demands amplify financial stress and restrict operational flexibility.
• Moreover, central funds are often allocated in a manner perceived as politically motivated, with financial assistance being extended as a quid pro quo to advance the ruling party’s interests.
• Recent examples include cash transfers to over a crore women in Bihar close to the 2025 Assembly polls and the special financial package announced for Andhra Pradesh in the Union Budget.
• There is also the politicised use of investigative agencies such as the CBI, ED and Income Tax Department against Opposition leaders, including the arrest of Chief Ministers and Ministers, and the toppling of elected governments.
• Finally, the overarching influence exercised through Governors acting on behalf of the Centre threatens to become the breaking point for Indian federalism.
• If such distortions continue unchecked, the Union risks becoming all-powerful while States are relegated to the status of subordinate administrative units.
• A democracy cannot endure when the popular mandate is overridden by unelected authorities.
• It is therefore essential for citizens to remain vigilant, institutions to introspect, and for the Supreme Court to revisit these issues—because safeguarding federalism is synonymous with safeguarding India’s constitutional identity