SAUDI - PAKISTAN PACT
1. Context
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have signed a mutual defence pact. The agreement formalises decades of informal military cooperation. Its timing, coming days after Israel’s bombing of Qatar and amid doubts over U.S. security guarantees to the Gulf monarchies, signals a shifting regional order
2. Terms of the agreement
- The idea of collective defence implies that both nations are bound to act if either faces a security threat. To operationalize this, they have agreed to set up permanent coordination structures, including a joint military committee, systems for sharing intelligence, and broader training initiatives.
- Pakistan has maintained a military presence in Saudi Arabia for many years, but the latest defence pact formally embeds this cooperation within a treaty framework. Saudi Arabia is also believed to have extended considerable financial support to Pakistan’s nuclear programme in the past.
- In his 2024 book War, American journalist Bob Woodward recounts a conversation between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham that underscores the closeness of their ties.
- When the Crown Prince mentioned plans for uranium enrichment, Senator Graham questioned whether it was intended for building a bomb. MBS reportedly replied that he wouldn’t need to manufacture one, as he could simply purchase it from Pakistan.
- Although such remarks highlight the depth of their strategic relationship, the agreement itself does not explicitly state that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would be available for Saudi defence—though Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has hinted at that possibility.
- The broader message is unmistakable: Saudi Arabia is signaling dissatisfaction with its existing security arrangements and inviting Pakistan to take on a greater strategic role in the Gulf
3. Significance of this agreement
- The timing of the agreement is as crucial as its substance. Saudi authorities revealed that negotiations with Pakistan had been underway for over a year, but the formal announcement came just a week after Israel’s strike on Qatar — a move that reflects the shifting security dynamics of the Gulf.
- Qatar hosts the Al-Udeid airbase, the largest American military installation in West Asia. Seeing such a well-fortified partner attacked without any repercussions appears to have convinced Riyadh that U.S. security assurances alone are no longer sufficient.
- This feeling of exposure is not new. Back in 2019, when Iran-backed groups targeted Saudi oil infrastructure, Washington refrained from intervening.
- The U.S., increasingly focused on East Asia, has little appetite to become deeply involved in Middle Eastern conflicts. Saudi Arabia’s strategic concerns are further sharpened by two developments — the ongoing Gaza conflict and the persistent threat from Yemen’s Houthis.
- The Hamas assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent Israeli offensive in Gaza derailed Riyadh’s U.S.-mediated plan to normalise ties with Tel Aviv through the Abraham Accords. The conflict has since widened across the region, adding to Gulf insecurity.
- At the same time, the Houthis have steadily strengthened their military capabilities. Their missile and drone operations have disrupted Saudi oil facilities and international shipping routes in the Red Sea.
- Even though a fragile truce exists, Riyadh still views them as a major threat. Despite repeated strikes by Saudi, U.S., and Israeli forces, the Houthis retain control over almost half of Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa.
- In this context, Pakistan emerges as a practical partner. As a Muslim-majority nation with a long history of providing military assistance to Saudi Arabia, it can reinforce Riyadh’s security. In return, Pakistan benefits from Saudi financial aid, which is vital for shoring up its struggling economy
4. West Asia and its Security Parade
- Before the October 7 attacks, Washington’s strategy focused on fostering closer ties between Israel and the Gulf monarchies. However, Israel’s subsequent military actions in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, and Qatar have unsettled Arab capitals.
- In the aftermath, Riyadh has made it clear that it would only normalise relations with Israel if Tel Aviv agrees to the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders.
- Israel, for its part, has rejected such an outcome, casting uncertainty over the future expansion of the Abraham Accords. By strengthening its partnership with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia is sending a clear message to both the U.S. and Israel that it intends to diversify its security partnerships.
- Still, this approach carries considerable risks. Pakistan might be pulled into Saudi Arabia’s ongoing rivalries with Iran or even into the Yemen conflict. Conversely, Riyadh could find itself exposed to South Asian instability, particularly if India–Pakistan tensions rise again.
- The agreement does not eliminate Saudi Arabia’s fundamental vulnerabilities — such as the threat from Iranian missiles or Houthi drones — but it does serve as a safeguard at a moment when U.S. commitments appear less dependable and Israeli actions are fueling regional instability
5. Saudi-Pakistan pact through the prism of India
- For India, the Saudi–Pakistan defence agreement presents challenges on several levels. Over the last ten years, New Delhi has significantly strengthened its engagement with Riyadh through energy cooperation, expanded trade, and counter-terrorism coordination.
- Nearly 2.6 million Indians live and work in Saudi Arabia, making the relationship crucial for both economic and social reasons.
- At the same time, India has cultivated a close strategic partnership with Israel, often showing a pro-Israel inclination in its West Asia policy.
- With Saudi–Israel normalisation stalled and Israel’s aggressive military actions unsettling Gulf states, Riyadh appears to have set aside India’s sensitivities by formalising security ties with Pakistan.
- The message seems clear: just as India can lean towards Israel, Saudi Arabia can tilt towards Pakistan.
- As Gulf monarchies broaden their network of alliances, they may pay less attention to India’s strategic concerns. If Pakistan manages to project itself as a reliable security partner for the region, India’s influence could diminish.
- Moreover, India must adapt to the wider transformation in the Gulf: U.S. dominance is waning, regional actors are reassessing their priorities, and traditional security structures are undergoing change.
- For New Delhi, vital interests — from energy security and safeguarding its expatriate community to preventing extremist threats — depend on ensuring stability in the Gulf.
- India’s most prudent response would be to pursue a balanced approach: consolidating its economic and political relations with Riyadh while simultaneously strengthening ties with other Gulf countries, Iran, and additional regional partners
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For Prelims: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, energy, water management, climate change, Belt and Road Initiative, Special Economic Zones, International North-South Transport Corridor, Chabahar Port,
For Mains:
1. Discuss the challenges and opportunities presented by CPEC for India in the context of regional cooperation and economic competitiveness. How can India navigate these challenges effectively? (250 Words)
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Previous Year Questions
Prelims:
1. Belt and Road Initiative’ is sometimes mentioned in the news in the context of the affairs of (UPSC CSE 2016) (a) African Union Answer: D 2. The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change recently published the draft Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, in 2020. Which of the following statements is correct about EIA? (Punjab Civil Service 2020)
1. It predicts the effect of a proposed industrial/infrastructural project on the environment.
2. It prevents the proposed activity/project from being approved without proper oversight or taking adverse consequences into account.
3. It compares various alternatives for a project and seeks to identify the one which represents the best combination of economic and environmental costs and benefits.
4. As per the new notification, Coal and non-Coal mineral prospecting and solar photovoltaic projects do not need prior environmental clearance.
Select the correct answer using the code given below:
A. Only 1 and 2
B. Only 2, 3 and 4
C. Only 1, 2 and 3
D. Only 1, 2 and 4
Answer: D
3. In the context of India’s preparation for Climate -Smart Agriculture, consider the following statements: (UPSC 2021)
1. The ‘Climate-Smart Village’ approach in India is part of a project led by the Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS), an international research program.
2. The project of CCAFS is carried out under the Consultative Group on International Agricultural (CGIAR) headquartered in France.
3. The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in India is one of the CGIAR’s research centers.
Which of the statements given above is correct?
(a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3
Answer: D
4. With reference to the water on the planet Earth, consider the following statements : (UPSC 2021)
1. The amount of water in the rivers and lakes is more than the amount of groundwater.
2. The amount of water in polar ice caps and glaciers is more than the amount of groundwater.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
A. 1 only
B. 2 only
C. Both 1 and 2
D. Neither 1 nor 2
Answer: B
5. Consider the following statements: (UPSC 2020)
1. 36% of India's districts are classified as "overexploited" or "critical" by the Central Ground Water Authority (CGWA).
2. CGWA was formed under the Environment (Protection) Act.
3. India has the largest area under groundwater irrigation in the world.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
A. 1 only
B. 2 and 3 only
C. 2 only
D. 1 and 3 only
6. Consider the following statements:
1. On the planet Earth, the freshwater available for use amounts to less than 1% of the total water found.
2. Of the total freshwater found on the planet Earth 95% is bound up in polar ice caps and glaciers.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
A. 1 only
B. 2 only
C. Both 1 and 2
D. Neither 1 nor 2
Answer: A
7. Special Economic Zones (SEZ) have been created first time in the: (OPSC OAS 2019)
A. EXIM Policy, 2000
B. EXIM Policy, 2005
C. Industrial Policy, 1956
D. Industrial Policy, 1991
Answer: A
8. Consider the statement: "India wants Chabahar port to be included in the 13-nations International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that extends from India to Russia." Which of the following country/countries is/are members of INSTC? (Haryana Civil Services 2021)
1. Iran
2. Iraq
3. China
4. Mongolia
Select the correct answer using the code given below:
A. 1 only B. 2 and 3 only C. 3 and 4 only D. 1, 3 and 4
Answer: A
9. What is the importance of developing Chabahar Port by India? (UPSC CSE 2017)
A. India's trade with African countries will enormously increase.
B. India's relations with oil-producing Arab countries will be strengthened.
C. India will not depend on Pakistan for access to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
D. Pakistan will facilitate and protect the installation of a gas pipe between Iraq and India.
Answer: C
Mains
1. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is viewed as a cardinal subset of China’s larger ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative. Give a brief description of CPEC and enumerate the reasons why India has distanced itself from the same. (UPSC CSE 2018) 2. China and Pakistan have entered into an agreement for the development of an economic corridor. What threat does this pose for India’s security? Critically examine. (UPSC CSE 2014) 3. “China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as tools to develop potential military power status in Asia”. In the light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbour. (UPSC CSE 2017) |
Source: The Hindu
