RUSSIA AND CHINA RELATIONSHIP

• China and Russia are not formal allies, meaning they have not committed to defend each other with military support
• But the two countries are close strategic partners, a relationship that deepened during the war in Ukraine as Russia became increasingly isolated from many other countries
• The partnership is fueled by a shared goal of trying to weaken U.S. power and influence
• The relationship between China and Russia has not always been so warm
• The two sides were fierce adversaries in the 1960s and clashed in 1969 over disputed territory along their border, raising fears at the time of a nuclear showdown between the two countries
• The two countries have also been competing for influence in Central Asia, a region the Kremlin has long seen as its turf but is becoming increasingly important to China’s geopolitical and economic ambitions
• China is building more railroads, highways and energy pipelines in former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which still rely on Russia as a crucial security partner

• Economic ties between China and Russia have strengthened significantly since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, when it annexed Crimea
• At the time, China helped Russia evade the sanctions imposed by the Obama administration that were supposed to cut off Russia’s access to global markets
• In the wake of harsher sanctions against Russia following the start of the Ukraine war last year, China has helped to supply many of the products that Russia previously purchased from Western-allied countries, including computer chips, smartphones and raw materials needed for military equipment
• Putin needs China to help bolster his economy, which has been battered by Western sanctions
• For the Russian leader, China has increasingly become a lifeline for investment and trade
• After Western countries restricted their purchases of Russian crude oil and natural gas last year, China helped offset the decline by buying more energy from Russia
• At the start of the Ukraine war, Russia asked China for military equipment and economic assistance
• China has refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, even though China’s foreign policy is rooted around the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity
• Although China has portrayed itself as a neutral party in the Ukraine war, it has endorsed Russian narratives, blaming the U.S. and NATO for starting the conflict
• China has also hesitated to put its full backing behind Russia. The turmoil and instability stemming from the war could threaten China’s growth and complicate its efforts to strengthen its economic ties around the world

• Xi wants Putin to join him as a like-minded ally in confronting U.S. and Western dominance
• China and Russia needed to cooperate to overcome challenges to their security, including “damaging acts of hegemony, domination and bullying.”
• Xi has pursued a harder stance against what he calls a U.S. effort to contain China’s rise, portraying China as a nation besieged — much as Putin has done in speeches to Russians
• Xi has urged Chinese industries to reduce their reliance on Western technology and hailed China’s growth as proof that it does not need to adopt Western political values
• China has been buying more advanced weapons from Russia to modernize its military, and the two nations have increased their joint military exercises
• President Joe Biden was visiting Tokyo, China and Russia sent bombers over the seas in northeast Asia as a show of force

1. First, being tied down in Ukraine has the effect of weakening Russia militarily, economically, and politically, This is a vacuum that China can step into, especially in Eurasia
2. Second, a prolonged conflict in Ukraine means that the West’s, and in particular the United States’, attention and resources are diverted  and this the Chinese see as a good thing.From Beijing’s point of view, it weakens the focus on and reduces the resources for any potential Western intervention on China’s eastern seaboard, particularly in the scenario of a crisis over Taiwan
3. Third, a continuing crisis in Ukraine offers opportunities for international messaging about the relative rise in Chinese power vis-à-vis both the Russians and Americans

• Clearly, Russia’s regional and global stature has taken a hit from what it has done and what it is unable to do  that is, to prosecute a quick end to the conflict
• Meanwhile, just as China’s role in helping Iran and Saudi Arabia restore diplomatic ties was intended to showcase Beijing’s rising influence and the decline of the US in the Middle Eastern region, the inability of the Ukrainians to expel the Russian invaders despite Western support can be used to send a signal in Europe
• If anything, China’s political support at forums such as the United Nations and elsewhere has been crucial to Russia building a case for the legitimacy of the war
• The agreement between Belarus and China earlier this year has sections on industrial production, joint R&D and defence cooperation  which could well allow for potential weapons production and transhipment to Russia

• The war brings costs to China  not just economic ones but political ones, too, especially from the major Western nations that are also big markets for Chinese manufacturing and sources for high technology
• But these are costs that the Chinese economy appears large enough to bear, especially when it is able to procure oil at deep discounts from Russia, and has had its own version of technological self-reliance programmes underway for decades
• China is also able to use its economic influence to carry out trade in its own currency with Russia and other sanctioned regimes — Iran, for example
• The impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on China is not just external and economic but also internal.
• An unstable external environment and its economic consequences can also be used to justify both China’s current economic difficulties in the wake of the pandemic as well as Xi’s continuing hold over the reins of power as being essential for national stability and recovery

• The China-Russia tango presents two challenges for India
• Delhi’s exercise of “strategic autonomy” over the last year has been premised on its long-standing partnership with Russia, but Moscow’s cosying up with Beijing is putting pressure on that relationship. Putin and Xi have condemned the Quad grouping of which India is a part
• Moscow’s positions on India’s LAC troubles with China fall well below what Delhi would like to hear from a friend, and it is not clear how that can be changed
• Secondly, internationally, the success of India’s presidency of the G20 will be measured on the outcome document, which needs the cooperation of both Moscow and Beijing