NCT of Delhi Act, 2021

1. Background

• In 1991 69th Constitutional Amendment Act was enacted  which designated the Union Territory of Delhi with a special status and redesignated it as the ‘National Capital Territory of Delhi’ and designated its administrator as the Lieutenant Governor (LG)
• 69th Constitutional Amendment Act resulted in the inclusion of Articles 239AA and 239BB 
• 1991 Act designated Delhi as a union territory with a fully elected legislative  legislature
• The Assembly had the power to legislate matters which are conferred in the ninth schedule that is state list and concurrent except land, police and public order.
• In case of difference between LG and council of ministers on any matter shall be referred to the President

• But the amendment  Amends the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991 to give primacy to the centrally appointed Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and make the elected Government of Delhi subsidiary. The elected government will now have to seek the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor for any executive action.

2. Certain amendments to the Bill

• Restriction on laws passed by the Assembly: The Bill provides that the term “government” referred to in any law made by the Legislative Assembly will imply Lieutenant Governor (LG). 
• Rules of Procedure of the Assembly: The Act allows the Legislative Assembly to make Rules to regulate the procedure and conduct of business in the Assembly.  The Bill provides that such Rules must be consistent with the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Lok Sabha.
• Inquiry by the Assembly into administrative decisions: The Bill prohibits the Legislative Assembly from making any rule to enable itself or its Committees to (i) consider the matters of the day-to-day administration of the NCT of Delhi and (ii) conduct an inquiry about administrative decisions.   Further, the Bill provides that all such rules made before its enactment will be void.
• Assent to Bills: The Act requires the LG to reserve certain bills passed by the Legislative Assembly for the consideration of the President.  These Bills are those: 
• which may diminish the powers of the High Court of Delhi, 
• which the President may direct to be reserved, 
• dealing with the salaries and allowances of the Speaker, Deputy Speaker, and members of the Assembly and the Ministers, or 
• relating to official languages of the Assembly or the NCT of Delhi. 
• The Bill requires the LG to also reserve those Bills for the President that incidentally cover any of the matters outside the purview of the powers of the Legislative Assembly.
• LG’s opinion on executive actions: The Act specifies that all executive action by the government, whether taken on the advice of the Ministers or otherwise, must be taken in the name of the LG.  The Bill adds that on certain matters, as specified by the LG, his opinion must be obtained before taking any executive action on the decisions of the Minister/ Council of Ministers.  

3. Opinion of Supreme court in 2021 verdict

• LG (Nominated)  was bound to act at the aid and advice of the                         council of ministers( elected) and LG has not been entrusted with any independent decision-making powers
• Concurrence of LG can be deferred (not required) on issues other than land, police and public order.
• LG (Nominated)  was bound to act at the aid and advice of the                         council of ministers( elected) and LG has not been entrusted with any independent decision-making powers
• Concurrence of LG can be deferred (not required) on issues other than land, police and public order.

4. Criticism associated with the provisions of the bill

• It is an unholy attempt to curtail the powers of a democratically elected Government 
• It is an affront not only to the will of the people but to the spirit of federalism 
•   It is being argued that by virtually handing over executive powers to the Lieutenant Governor, the government has acted against the spirit of the Supreme Court ruling that aimed to safeguard the elected government of Delhi from undue interference or obstacles from the Lieutenant Governor. 
• The amendment stipulates that the State government shall obtain the Lieutenant Governor’s opinion on its decisions before taking executive action on them. 
• This prevents the government from urgently acting in case of an emergency as it would have to wait for the Lieutenant Governor’s assent/viewpoint.
• Significantly, the Lieutenant Governor is not obliged to give his opinion to the State government within a time frame. 
• Critics argue that the Lieutenant Governor could politically exploit these unbridled powers to hamper the government’s administrative work and thus turn the political tides against the incumbent if he so desires. 
• That truly would undermine the interests of the party in power and also of the people.

5. Critical assessment of the federal system in India

• The temperament of federalism in India during the coalition era has been changed discernibly. 
• Political deliberation seems to surpass the administrative and financial aspects of the Union-state relations in India. 
• The states having the governments of those parties that form part of the central coalition gives the impression that to have little conflict with the Centre. 
• Their complaint is submissive or subdued and the general awareness is that they get particular contemplation and hold in matters of resources approved by the Centre. 
• As a consequence, it is raising that noise sometimes that the Centre is being partial against the states having governments of the opposition parties. However, when one becomes aware of the allocations of the Central plan fund released by the Planning Commission on an annual basis, it appears that there is no such obtrusive discrimination. 
• There is called for a more widespread perception of evenhandedness and fairness. 
• There has been a steady requirement of the National Development Council, which is a delegate institution of the Centre and the states, should become more energetic and effective. 
• It may be brought to mind that the First Administrative Reforms Commission had suggested that the NDC be supposed to meet twice a year. 
• Even after more than forty years, this proposal has not been put into practice. In a true federal spirit, the NDC, instead of becoming a mere routinized rubber stamp, should re-emerge as a verbal and effectual gadget of Centre-state discourse in matters of development. 
• Here is an organization that has the potentiality of making the Indian federal economic structure more powerful and therefore, this instrumentality ought not to become a superfluous union. 
• A linked problem pertains to the role played by the state planning system. Most of the socio-economic plans calculated at the state level are an upshot and replicas of the priority structures and store management projects of the Central government, more particularly of the Planning Commission. 

6. Way forward for cooperative federalism

• Hence, to make the planning process truly federal, “planning from below” is supposed to become the established doctrine of the Indian expansion state of affairs.